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Abstract:  
 
Applying discursive institutionalism, this article identifies a hitherto overlooked 
disconnect between rule adoption and implementation and their discursive denial as 
an example of ‘shallow’ Europeanisation. This empirical study of Serbia’s visa 
liberalisation and implications for its Kosovo policy, resulting from the simultaneous 
pursuit of Enlargement and Common Foreign and Security Policy, demonstrates the 
European Union’s leverage on policy, pointing to Serbia’s compliance indicative of 
recognition of Kosovo’s border, which is obscured by nationalist discourse on 
Serbia’s territorial integrity. Such incoherent Europeanisation in policy and discursive 
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domains exposes limits to the explanatory purchase of rational institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism.  
Key words: Europeanisation, discursive institutionalism, visa liberalisation, Serbia, 
Kosovo.  
 
Introduction1  
 
The study of the impact of European integration on the polities, economies and 
societies of the Western Balkans has emerged as a subfield of the Europeanisation 
literature (cf. Sedelmeier 2011). Although Croatia is on the cusp of EU membership 
and Montenegro started accession negotiations, the European path of other countries, 
such as Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, remains contested, 
despite the EU’s long-standing commitment, engagement and investment in the 
region (Gordon 2010). Consequently, scholars and practitioners have begun to ponder 
whether the ‘accession magic’ can work again as it did in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) (Grabbe 2009)?  
 
Existing rational institutionalist and sociological institutionalist theories have 
generated two approaches to tackling the puzzle of the EU’s limited and differential 
transformative power in the Western Balkans. The rational institutionalist approach is 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgements: I thank members of the South East Europe Working Group of 
the British International Studies Association (BISA) and Mary Martin for their useful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to two anonymous 
reviewers for their pertinent remarks and helpful suggestions.  
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informed by Goetz’s (2005, p. 262) notion of Europeanisation as ‘shallow 
institutionalisation’, capturing a disconnect between rule adoption and rule 
implementation. In this view, the transposition of European rules into domestic 
institutions is not accompanied by appropriate adaptation of practices and behaviour. 
The actors’ formal response to external incentives goes hand in hand with full or 
partial resistance to the adaptation costs (Börzel 2011; Elbasani 2009), not unlike in 
CEE and the Eastern Balkans (Romania and Bulgaria), both during accession and 
post-accession stages (Dimitrova 2010). The sociological institutionalist approach, 
contrastingly, uses divergence in identities and norms to explain either stalled 
Europeanisation (Subotić 2011) or fake, partial, or imposed compliance (Noutcheva 
2009).  
 
This article provides an alternative explanation of the complexity of Europeanisation 
in the Western Balkans from a discursive institutionalist perspective. A discursive 
analysis of policy adaptation required for Serbia’s visa liberalisation, including 
additional requests made on Serbia with a profound impact on its Kosovo policy, 
demonstrates that the European rules were adopted and enforced, but that the policy 
adaptation was denied in the discourse. Such a disconnect between discursive 
conception of norms, as opposed to their formal conception (Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier 2005, p. 8), has thus far been overlooked in existing explanations of 
‘shallow’ Europeanisation in the Western Balkans. Empirical findings presented in 
this article question the propositions that, on the one hand, the rational cost-benefit 
calculation of actors, and, on the other hand, socialisation as well as norm and identity 
convergence or divergence, are reliable predictors of the full scope of the domestic 
adjustment. The discursive institutionalist perspective provides an analytical tool to 
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capture the incoherence and complexity of domestic adaptation in different domains 
of Europeanisation. Operationalising the discursive institutionalist perspective, the 
article contributes to the study of ideational and discursive mechanisms as an 
explanation of domestic adaptation in the context of European integration 
(Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2012, p. 33). Engaging the scholarship which posits that 
‘ideas can become major causal factors that help explain major political processes’ 
(Béland & Cox 2011, p. 15), the findings confirm a need to understand further the role 
of ‘discursive incoherence and conflict as mechanism(s) of Europeanization’ 
(Lynggaard 2012, p. 97).    
 
In research design, this explanation of complexity of Serbia’s Europeanisation departs 
from the analysis of domestic adaptation limited to the Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAP), the EU’s pre-accession instrument for the Western Balkans. I suggest 
that the exclusive focus on the SAP is much too narrow either to capture 
comprehensively the extent of domestic change in the Western Balkans or to explain 
resistance to it. Also, the literature on the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CSFP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the Western 
Balkans, has been largely limited to the study of security dividends of EU policies, 
such as broader trends in the SAP or conflict resolution (Noutcheva 2009; Coppetiers 
et al. 2004), without considering the ESDP’s impact on specific policy areas within 
the SAP, including their scope and variability.  
 
Yet, Hughes (2010, p. 7) notes the tension arising from ‘the EU attempts to combine 
simultaneously policies that are not always compatible: containing, and moving 
beyond conflict, while also advancing the process of accession for the countries 
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involved’. Therefore, I premise the study of Serbia’s Europeanisation on EU’s 
complex actorness (cf. Papadimitriou, Petrov & Greiçevci 2007; Rosamund 2007, p. 
249), which is disaggregated in the research design in order to investigate a cross-
policy impact resulting from EU’s simultaneous involvement through the SAP and 
ESDP policy-envelopes in the Western Balkans. This is distinct from the study of 
domestic change driven simultaneously by the EU and other institutions such as 
NATO, OECD or World Bank (Grabbe 2001, p. 1027-28; Wallace 2001, p. 12-3; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004, p. 666; Aybet & Bieber 2011). In sum, I 
investigate whether the EU’s engagement through multiple policy instruments 
furthers the goal of approximation to the EU.  
 
Current findings by scholars who note the EU’s multiple policy instruments in the 
Western Balkans lead to contradictory conclusions. Some argue that these instruments 
are a sign of the EU’s strength in engaging the region (Vachudova 2003, p. 141; 
Montanaro-Jankovski 2007; Tocci 2007, p. 174). Others point to their adverse effect, 
both on the approximation process and the EU’s credibility in the region (Ilievski & 
Taleski 2010; Massari 2005). The findings of this study fall in neither camp. Drawing 
on extensive primary evidence in the analysis of the EU’s parallel engagement 
through the SAP and ESDP, the article points to a normative incongruence: policy 
convergence coexists with its discursive negation, including the rejection of European 
integration, which results in uneven Europeanisation between discourse and policy 
domains. The analysis reveals a complex pattern of Europeanisation in Serbia, 
simultaneously denoting approximation and resistance. It demonstrates the EU’s 
leverage to induce domestic change, but not in ways that would be expected or 
predicted comprehensively by RI or SI.  
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This article first sets out a discursive institutionalist approach to the study of 
Europeanisation by focusing on discursive causality alongside the research 
methodology used to track the EU’s pursuit of the SAP and the ESDP in Serbia and 
Kosovo. After providing some background to the EU’s involvement in Serbia, the 
article goes on to present empirical evidence on policy adaptation as a form of 
Europeanisation and demonstrates a cross-policy impact. A discursive analysis of the 
cross-policy impact follows, revealing normative incongruence between discourse and 
policy. The next section evaluates empirical findings from sociological 
institutionalist, rational institutionalist and discursive institutionalist perspective. The 
qualitative method used in this article combines the analysis of discursive frames 
based on a systematic review of the Serbian media,2 triangulated by conducting semi-
structured interviews with state officials and civil society actors involved in Serbia’s 
visa liberalisation and EU integration, alongside process-tracing and secondary 
desktop research analysing EU documents as well as contracts with Serbia, including 
official Serbian documents and public opinion polls.3  
                                                 
2 The qualitative analysis of discursive frames by key actors was deemed most 
appropriate for this case study due to repetition of statements by same actors in daily 
press, radio and TV outlets based on agency reports of the Beta, FoNet and Tanjug 
news agencies. The press review included key dailies Danas, Politika, Glas javnosti, 
Blic; weeklies NIN and Vreme; reports by B92 (radio) and RTV Serbia (TV), whose 
news bulletins are published on their websites in 2007-2010. 
3 The findings are part of a research project on Europeanisation of Serbia that includes 
extensive fieldwork alongside over 60 semi-structured and informal interviews, from 
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Europeanisation and discursive institutionalism  
 
The concept of Europeanisation, minimally, denotes any domestic change in response 
to the policies of the European Union (Featherstone 2003, p. 3). The paper relies on 
Radaelli’s (2003, p. 30) definition of Europeanisation, referring to:  
 
Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of 
doing things,” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, 
and public policies. 
 
This definition extends Europeanisation as a concept (Mair 2004, p. 340), while 
usefully distinguishing between different domains of Europeanisation: discourse and 
public policy (Radaelli 2003, Figure, 2.1, p. 35; cf. Börzel & Risse 2003, Figure 3.1, 
p. 60). While analytically distinct, these two domains are linked through ‘the role of 
discourse within processes of political change’ (Radaelli & Schmidt 2004, p. 366).  
 
This paper adopts a bottom-up approach to Europeanisation and the study of discourse 
therein. The bottom-up approach ‘starts and finishes at the level of domestic actors’ 
(Radaelli & Pasquier 2007, p. 41), and has methodological implications for the study 
                                                                                                                                            
2006 to 2010. The criterion used for citation of interviews here is their direct 
relevance to visa liberalisation.  
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of the direction of a causal relation (Lynggaard 2011, p. 23). The focus on the 
domestic arena addresses a gap in the literature on Europeanisation of post-
Communist states (Sedelmeier 2011, p. 30; Fink-Hafner 2008). Further, in line with 
the bottom-up approach, discourse is considered here in the national context. 
However, the national discourse(s) are not analysed, following Diez (2001, p. 6), in 
the narrow national sense, but as competing discourses indicative of Europeanisation 
and the extent of their effect on norms and polices.  
 
This study applies discursive institutionalism (DI), elaborated by Schmidt (2008), as 
an alternative to rational institutionalism (RI) and sociological institutionalism (SI) to 
explain Europeanisation. DI identifies the causal influence of discourse that follows 
the ‘logic of communication’, as opposed to the ‘logic of consequentialism’ and the 
‘logic of appropriateness’ associated with RI and SI respectively.4 The ‘logic of 
communication’ derives from the power of discourse to effect institutional change, 
while the explanation of its causal power is centred on agents, rather than on structure 
and incentives as in RI or norms as in SI. Furthermore, DI is distinguished from SI, 
with which it broadly shares a constructivist take on identity and ideas as endogenous 
and socially constructed. But, while SI treats ideas as static structures, ideas are 
treated as dynamic constructs in DI (Schmidt 2008, p. 320).  
 
Schmidt (2008, p. 311) specifies that discourse is causally effective in two ways: as a 
representation of ideas and as a discursive process by which those ideas are conveyed. 
                                                 
4 Börzel’s (2005, pp. 52-8) overview contextualises the two logics identified by 
March and Olsen (1989, 1998) in the field of European integration studies (Cf. 
Checkel 1999; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004).  
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Consequently, to consider Schmidt’s transformative power of discourse as a 
mechanism, which explains a systematic relationship between two events, entails 
coherence and persuasion (Lynggaard 2012, p. 97). As a representation, a discourse 
becomes successful if it has ‘relevance to the issues at hand, adequacy, applicability, 
appropriateness and resonance’ (Schmidt 2008, p. 311). As a process of discursive 
interactions, it is more than an expression of one set of actors’ interests or normative 
values because it serves ‘to persuade others of the necessity and/or appropriateness of 
a given course of action’ (Schmidt 2008, p, 312). In sum, discourse has political 
consequences. It is a vehicle for legitimation of political ideas, including justifying the 
change of others’ ‘views of the world, their normative beliefs, their preferences and 
even their identities’ (Risse 2000, p. 8). This, in turn, influences policy prescription 
and policy production (Schmidt & Radaelli 2004, p. 192). 
 
Therefore, scholars have assumed normative congruence between discourse and 
policy change or resistance. A lack of legitimating discourse was identified as an 
obstacle to policy change or elite socialisation (Schmidt 2007; Kratochvíl 2008; 
Dimitrova 2002). The actor-centred approach to discursive practices revealed a range 
of European discourses in given policy areas (Thatcher 2004; Flockhart 2005; della 
Porta & Caiani 2006), pointing to the contested nature of Europeanisation across 
countries, policies and over time (Liebert 2008). However, this approach has not 
challenged the premise of normative congruence between discourse and policy 
outcome: actors’ legitimating discourse will be favourable to policies advancing 
adaptation in line with EU rules and norms, and vice versa. 
  
 10  
While discourse provides ‘a repertoire of discursive resources in the form of available 
narratives and understandings at the disposal of political actors’ (Hay & Rosamund 
2002, pp. 151-52), the consideration of discourse as a ‘strategic choice’ (Lynggaard  
2012, p. 93; cf. Schimmelfennig 2001; Fouilleux 2004) calls for further critical 
analysis of discourse in relation to institutional change. To operationalise a ‘sceptical 
bottom-up approach’ along with an appropriate analytical framework ‘able to 
accommodate a significant degree of complexity – indeed of incoherence’ in 
Europeanisation (Wincott 2004, p. 356), this article contends that normative 
congruence between discourse and policy has to come under scrutiny.  
 
Schmidt argues that DI can explain the unexpected ‘because the unexpected may 
actually be expectable when analysis is based on a particular set of ideational rules 
and discursive regularities in a given meaning context following a particular logic of 
communication […] (Schmidt, 2008, p. 314).’ To build in the hypothesized 
incoherence in the discursive practice and policy production, this research is informed 
by Milliken’s (1999, p. 243) juxtapositional method, that juxtaposes ‘the ‘truth’ about 
a situation constructed within a particular discourse to events and issues that this 
‘truth’ fails to acknowledge or address […].’ The type of discourse studied is 
‘communicative’, relating to the political sphere encompassing a broader debate and 
deliberation on policy, as opposed to ‘coordinative’ discourse, circumscribed to policy 
actors and focusing on policy formulation (Schmidt 2008, p. 310-13). Serbia fits the 
model of a ‘simple’ polity where the communicative discourse is more elaborate. 
However, the dominance of one type of discourse does not preclude competition 
among discourses. Bolleyer & Radaelli (2009, p. 389) note that such ‘competition 
implies a multi-actor notion of communicative discourse’. In other words, DI focuses 
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on interactive processes involving discourse, while bringing in agency to the forefront 
of analysis, as opposed to the structure as in RI and norms as in SI (Schmidt 2008, pp. 
304-5). Ultimately, the aim of this article is to investigate and explain how discourse 
succeeds, i.e. has causal consequence(s). Discourse as a representation and discourse 
as an interactive process are used to account for domestic adaptation as an indicator of 
EU’s leverage in Serbia. While considering the EU’s parallel pursuit of the SAP and 
the ESDP, this article draws on Schmidt & Radaelli’s (2004) distinction between two 
types of relations involving discourse: that between different discourses and that 
between discourse and policy. Therefore, instead of just asking how discourse induces 
policy change to advance Europeanisation as would be a case in the study of a single 
policy frame (Kallestrup 2002; Meyer 2005), this research additionally specifies what 
discourses and what policies in line with its focus on the cross-policy impact between 
the SAP and the ESDP. Before proceeding to the analysis of Europeanisation in 
policy and discursive domains, the following section sets out the context for Serbia’s 
European integration.  
 
Serbia’s approximation to the European Union: SAP and ESDP  
 
The SAP, the EU’s policy instrument for engaging with the Western Balkans, 
predates the accession process. With the ultimate reward of EU membership distant, a 
system of intermediate rewards, such as visa liberalisation, becomes essential to keep 
the ‘wheels’ of European integration going (Anastasakis 2008, p. 368; Vachudova 
2005, p. 251), while contributing towards extensive domestic adaptation (Renner and 
Trauner 2009; Grabbe 2006). Maintaining engagement with the EU has been 
particularly important in Serbia because the EU suspended the SAP due to the failure 
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to fulfil conditionality, specifically collaboration with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Subotić 2010; Braniff 2011, pp. 123-38). In 
addition, Serbia’s approximation with the EU since Slobodan Milošević’s fall in 2000 
has been defined by instability of Serbia’s borders, which triggered EU’s increased 
involvement through the CFSP and ESDP alongside the SAP. Consequently, Serbia’s 
Europeanisation has been shaped by the EU’s simultaneous pursuit of policies in both 
areas (See Table 1). 
 
Serbia’s European journey has unfolded in fits and starts. Initially, the process of EU 
integration was slowed down by the dysfunctional nature of the Serbia and 
Montenegro union. Its dissolution, under EU brokerage, allowed Serbia to pursue the 
European project separately (Kris 2007; Tocci 2007, pp. 78-99), but progress ground 
to a halt. On 6 May 2006 negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with Serbia were suspended due to a lack of cooperation with the ICTY. Over 
a year later negotiations restarted upon production of evidence of sufficient 
cooperation with the ICTY, but with a number of suspected war criminals still at 
large. Nonetheless, progress led to the initialling of SAA and ultimately its signing 
along with the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Issues (IA) on 29 April 
2008. However, no sooner did Serbia sign the SAA than the agreement was 
suspended, again owing to ICTY conditionality. The subsequent extradition of all 
suspected war criminals was rewarded through Serbia gaining candidate status in 
March 2012, but the start of accession negotiations still hinges on progress on 
normalisation of relations with Kosovo. Visa liberalisation with Serbia in December 
2009 took place at an extremely delicate moment in Serbia’s accession process, while 
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the SAA was blocked. It played a key role in demonstrating the EU’s commitment to 
Serbia.  
 
Alongside ICTY conditionality, Serbia’s European integration was overshadowed by 
border issues. The dissolution of Serbia Montenegro union coincided with the start of 
the final status talks on Kosovo, which led to Kosovo’s independence declaration on 
17 February 2008 after the failure of the negotiated settlement pursued by former 
Finnish President Maarti Ahtisaari. The EU did not present a common position on 
Kosovo independence: 22 member-states endorsed it leaving 5 non-recognisers. 
However, the EU reaffirmed its commitment to increasing its political and security 
role in Kosovo in line with the Ahtisaari plan, which provided a detailed proposal for 
internal governance and external civilian and military supervision. The Council Joint 
Action of 4 February 2008 had already established the European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), before the independence declaration, allowing the EU 
to manage the contentious issue of Kosovo’s independence. EULEX was deployed in 
Kosovo in the framework of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 to 
operate in the ‘status neutral’ manner, which became a source of tension with the 
Kosovo government (Krasniqi 2010, pp. 25-6). All 27 member-states supported the 
EULEX, the biggest ESDP rule of law mission, along with the EU’s key role in 
overseeing the implementation of the Ahtisaari plan in Kosovo. Serbs acquiesced to 
the mission’s deployment on the ground in late 2008 after the UN backed the 
reconfiguration of United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), previously governing Kosovo, which heralded a range of legal and 
operational contradictions and ambiguities (Koeth 2010; de Wet 2009). Serbia has 
since made advances in cooperation with the EULEX, including signing the protocol 
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on police cooperation as a part of the policy conditionality required for visa 
liberalisation.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In summary, the independence of Kosovo did not prevent a deepening of the 
contractual relationship between Serbia and the EU. However, as it will be shown 
below, Kosovo’s independence profoundly affected both the substance of policies as 
well as the normative dimension of Serbia’s approximation. It led to a cross-over 
between the EU’s SAP and ESDP policies, and practically introduced Kosovo 
conditionality into the process of Serbia’s approximation with the EU with a request 
for a concrete (and prompt) policy adjustment resulting from the new reality on the 
ground. The policy cross-over between the SAP and ESDP impacted Serbia’s 
Europeanisation, whose complexity and incoherence are analysed in the following 
sections by distinguishing between Europeanisation in policy and discursive domains.   
 
Visa liberalisation as Europeanisation in a policy domain 
 
The Council of the European Union granted visa-free travel to and throughout the 
Schengen area for citizens of Serbia, as well as Macedonia and Montenegro, from 19 
December 2009. Moving the start date nearly two weeks forward from the expected 
date, the beginning of the visa free regime came across as an EU’s ‘gift’ made in the 
festive spirit. It marked the end of Serbia’s nearly 20-year-long isolation from the EU 
and the rest of the international community since the start of the Yugoslav wars and 
the imposition of UN sanctions on Serbia in 1992. The symbolic importance of this 
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event was not lost on the Serbian leadership. Serbia’s former pro-European President 
of the Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka) Boris Tadić called it ‘the day of 
liberation from the last remaining sanctions on Serbia.’5  
 
The then Serbian government was equally keen to emphasise their and the EU’s 
shared commitment to Serbia’s EU membership, by describing the visa free regime as 
‘the first and clear step towards European integration’ as well as ‘the signal that 
confirms Serbia’s European future.’6 Above all, from the perspective of domestic 
adaptation in the policy domain, the visa liberalisation process demonstrated Serbia’s 
ability to take on the obligations specified by the EU, enabled by its administrative 
capacity building (Cf. Grabbe, Knaus & Korski 2010, p. 3). It also confirmed its 
readiness for further transformation beyond the Justice and Home Affairs policy area. 
The visa liberalisation process from the Serbian point of view was an exemplary ‘in 
miniature’ exercise for how EU conditionality could work. There was a road map, the 
obligations were clear and, above all, the reward looked credible, effective and within 
reach.7  
 
The EU’s perception of the Western Balkans as a possible source of instability and a 
shift towards desecuritisation of the region shaped the visa liberalisation process 
(Trauner 2007; Petrovic 2010). The EU started visa free travel dialogue with Western 
Balkans in 2006, which led to the initialling of the visa facilitation and readmission 
                                                 
5 Danas, 30 November 2009. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Interview with high Serbian government official working on EU integration, 
Belgrade, 21 April 2010. 
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agreements between the EU and Serbia on 16 May 2007. The process was explicitly 
linked to progress made on reforms in the area of fighting illegal immigration. The 
agreement came into force on 1 January 2008. On 7 May 2008 the European 
Commission presented the Road Map on visa liberalisation to Serbia, specifying 
benchmarks that Serbia needed to fulfil in order to be included on the White Schengen 
list. The Road Map encompassed, on the one hand, the Readmission Agreement and, 
on the other, the Visa Facilitation Agreement, including four areas of policy 
adaptation: document security; illegal migration (which includes border management 
as well as migration management); external relations and fundamental rights; public 
order and security (including issues related to prevention and fighting organised 
crime, terrorism and corruption, as well as judicial cooperation in criminal matters).  
 
The technical nature of the Road Map, along with its association with the ‘European 
perspective of the Western Balkans’,8 was hailed as an intensification of cooperation 
between Serbia and the EU. Visa liberalisation became the Serbian government’s 
‘number one priority, as it held out the prospect of tangible goods it could deliver to 
its citizens’.9 However, the process soon had to take into account the changed political 
environment defined by Kosovo’s independence declared earlier that year. This threw 
up the unforeseen issue of control of Kosovo’s border with Serbia, which was not 
recognised by Serbia but now formed part of the outside border of the Schengen zone, 
whose securing is critical for the security of the EU. The EU approached the problem 
                                                 
8 ‘Visa Liberalisation with Serbia: Roadmap’, 2008, available at: 
http://eu.prostir.ua/data?t:1, accessed 10 September 2011. 
 
9 Interview with civil society expert on security, Belgrade, 23 December 2009. 
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through the ESDP policy framework, and resolved it by signing a protocol on 
cooperation between EULEX, the EU’s rule of law mission in Kosovo, and the 
Serbian Ministry of the Interior.  
  
This approach resulted in an entirely new demand on Serbia presented in the 
European Commission’s proposal for granting visa free travel to Serbia on 15 July 
2009. Visa free travel for Serbia was within reach, but pending completion of 
outstanding reforms outlined in the Road Map, and, effectively, a new condition – 
direct cooperation with EULEX. On 11 September 2009, EULEX and Serbia signed a 
protocol on cooperation to address organised crime, including drug trafficking, people 
smuggling, illegal border crossing and other illegal activities. The protocol laid 
grounds for the establishment of mechanisms and procedures for regular exchange of 
information. The implementation of the protocol and the need for its further 
improvement were reported in the EU’s documents (Cf. EC 2010, p. 53).10 An 
example of collaboration between EULEX and the Serbian police is the identification 
of ‘hot areas’ with a high rate of illegal activity along the Kosovo border.11 The 
                                                 
10 Analytical Report (2011) European Commission. SEC(2011)1208 
Accompanying the document Commission Opinion on Serbia's application for 
membership of the European Union {COM(2011)668}, 12 October, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_analytical_rap
port_2011_en.pdf, accessed 15 January 2013, p. 34. 
11 Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova Srbije, 1 June 2011, available at: 
http://www.mup.gov.rs/cms_cir/saopstenja.nsf/arhiva-saopstenja-
MUP.h?OpenPage&ExpandSection=17, accessed 10 January 2013. 
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cooperation with EULEX became part of the Serbian police’s activities,12 and its 
success owes to the focus on technical matters.13 The protocol was a watershed in 
Serbia’s dealing with Kosovo-related issues in the context of EU integration. Through 
cooperation with EULEX, Serbia acknowledged the ‘reality in Kosovo’.14 In addition, 
the protocol foreshadowed subsequent agreements in 2011, such as that on the 
Integrated Border Management (IBM) on the Kosovo border (EC 2012, p. 19),15 
achieved as part of the EU-sponsored Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. The police protocol 
between EULEX and the Serbian police was supported by all 27 member-states. The 
protocol, which rounded off all conditions for a visa free regime, is a demonstrable 
cross-over of EU’s two policy portfolios – visa liberalisation, linked to SAP, and 
collaboration with EULEX through ESDP.  
 
In summary, from the perspective of policy as a discrete domain of Europeanisation, 
visa liberalisation for Serbia, as in Croatia and Macedonia (Trauner 2011), is an 
example of the effectiveness of the EU’s leverage. According to a Serbian interior 
affairs official involved in the process, visa liberalisation resulted in ‘reform of the 
entire system’, ranging from the adoption of the legal framework to the development 
                                                 
12 Informator o radu Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova Srbije (2013) Ministarstvo 
unutrašnjih poslova Srbije, Beograd, p. 215.  
13 Interview with an expert based at a think tank dealing with security issues, Belgrade 
(by phone), 5 February 2013.  
14 Helsinški komitet za ljudska prava u Srbiji (2009) ‘Srbija: postepeno prihvatanje 
kosovske realnosti’, Helsinki Bulletin, No. 9 
15 International Crisis Group (2013) Serbia and Kosovo: The Path to Normalisation, 
Europe Report 19 (Brussels), 19 February, pp. 14-18. 
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of administrative capacity.16 In fact, the Serbian government went beyond what was 
originally expected in signing the protocol on cooperation with EULEX. The policy 
cross-over also forced the Serbian government to undertake steps that tacitly 
recognised the situation on the ground in Kosovo.17  
 
The visa liberalisation process had a win-win outcome for Serbia and the EU. It 
provided evidence of the Serbian Government’s ability to deliver on European 
integration while also delivering tangible benefits to the people. An opinion poll 
recorded an increase in support for European integration, directly linked to impending 
visa liberalisation, to a high of 71 percent.18 It reaffirmed the somewhat shaken belief 
in EU conditionality and the ‘reward’ logic of the process and speeded up 
approximation to the EU, as Serbia’s membership application on 22 December 2009 
demonstrated. Furthermore, visa liberalisation drew Serbia into direct collaboration 
with the EULEX mission in Kosovo. 
 
Visa liberalisation as Europeanisation in a discursive domain  
 
The same process of visa liberalisation looks very different from the perspective of 
Europeanisation in the discursive domain. From its onset, visa liberalisation, 
promoted by the then Serbian governing coalition, was contested not only by the 
                                                 
16 Interview with Serbian interior affairs official involved in visa liberalisation, 
Belgrade, 22 December 2009.  
17 Interview with former Serbian foreign affairs official (whose term overlapped with 
the start of the visa liberalisation), Belgrade, 21 December 2009.    
18 B92, 7 November 2009. 
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nationalist opposition in the Serbian Parliament but also by a range of other policy-
relevant actors, reflecting what Subotić calls ‘multiple sites of domestic resistance 
 to broad-spectrum Europeanization’ (2010, p. 611). Notably, the voice of Kosovo 
Serbs was prominent in this debate, indicating the extent of Serbia’s public sphere. 
Further, the discourse on Serbia’s visa liberalisation illustrates to what extent the SAP 
and the ESDP had become intertwined, affecting the debate not just on Serbia’s visa 
liberalisation, but also, importantly, on Serbia’s European integration. The linkage 
that the Serbian pro-European leadership made between Kosovo and European 
integration in response to the SAP and the ESDP policy cross-over points to an 
unexpected role of discourse: compliance was enabled by discursive denial of the 
extent of actual policy adaptation required and, indeed, implemented, for Serbia’s visa 
liberalisation.  
 
Due to the introduction of the Kosovo issue into the process of visa liberalisation, this 
technical policy area was cast in terms of a threat to national identity.19 Accordingly, 
the debate about visa liberalisation was discursively framed by issues concerning 
citizenship, borders, and Serbia's territorial integrity. Such discursive representation 
was underpinned by the Commission’s approach to visa liberalisation, which 
excluded Kosovo from the process. Although Kosovo is referred to as ‘Kosovo under 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244’ in the EU documents, and the EU member-
states lack an agreed position on Kosovo’s independence, a separate treatment of 
Kosovo in Serbia’s visa liberalisation process was interpreted in Serbia as the EU 
                                                 
19 Interview with a civil society expert on security issues, Belgrade, 23 December 
2009. 
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position on Serbia’s territorial integrity, in particular among the sceptics of European 
integration.  
 
From Serbia’s perspective, the exclusion of Kosovo from the process meant that 
Kosovo Serbs (alongside Kosovo Albanians) would not be subject to the new visa 
regime. In fact, Serbia had to actively implement a series of measures to ensure the 
exclusion of Kosovo Serbs from the visa free regime.20 Furthermore, as Kacarska 
notes (2012, p.11), this policy created several categories of Kosovo Serbs since Serbs 
residing in Kosovo could not take advantage of visa liberalisation (unlike Kosovo 
Serbs internally displaced inside Serbia). The parliamentary opposition in Serbia 
seized on this, accusing the Serbian government of abandoning their co-nationals, 
implicitly recognising Kosovo’s independence, selling out national interests and 
ultimately betraying the nation.21 According to the former Prime Minister and leader 
of the Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije), Vojislav Koštunica, 
‘the ‘White Schengen’ directly discriminates and divides the citizens of Serbia.’22 
Consequently, this party described visa liberalisation as ‘rump liberalisation,’ and, 
                                                 
20 ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation’, Commission of the European Communities, 
Brussels, COM(2009) 366 final 2009/0104 (CNS), 2009, available at: 
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/schengen_white_list_project_Commission%20proposal%
20for%20visa-free%20travel%20%2815%20July%202009%29.pdf, accessed 15 July 
2011, p. 7. 
 
21 B92, 15 July 2009. 
22 Danas, 13 July 2009. 
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therefore, evidence of the government’s failure.23 Others, like a Serbian Radical Party 
(Srpska radikalna stranka) representative, said that visa liberalisation was the ‘bitter 
pill’ of a de facto recognition of Kosovo’s independence.24 These views were 
reiterated by smaller parliamentary parties.25 The reaction from Kosovo Serbs 
reinforced this criticism. A group representing Kosovo Serbs said that it is humiliating 
for Serbian citizens that giving up on Kosovo is a condition for visa liberalisation.26  
 
The criticism was amplified following the announcement and eventual signing of the 
protocol on police cooperation between EULEX and the Serbian police. Critics of the 
Serbian government’s decision reiterated the charges that the visa regime would 
divide the Serbs. Kosovo Serbs stepped up their attack, arguing that the protocol 
would contribute to ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Serbs from Kosovo.27 According to them, 
the agreement would diminish Serb numbers in Kosovo, ‘since many may seek to 
change their residence, which means abandoning their centuries-old hearths.’28  
 
At the same time, the nature of the protocol, which paved the way for cross-border 
cooperation, drew attention to the sensitive issue of Serbia’s contested border. The 
Belgrade daily Danas published the text of the protocol on police cooperation 
between the Serbian police and EULEX. Of particular interest was the translation of 
                                                 
23 B92, 15 July 2009. 
24 Blic, 15 July 2009. 
25 Glas javnosti, 16 July 2009. 
26 B92, 15 July 2009. 
27 Politika, 15 July 2009. 
28 Ibid. 
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‘cross-border/boundary’ as ‘prekogranični/pogranični’ in reference to the nature of 
crime and necessary cooperation.29 The word ‘border’, which denotes delineation 
between two internationally-recognised states, was used rather than ‘administrative 
line’ in accordance with Serbia’s policy of non-recognition of Kosovo.30 For the 
nationalist opposition, such wording was evidence for its claim that the protocol is a 
betrayal of national and state interests. In unison with the Kosovo Serbs, the Serbian 
opposition claimed that the agreement with EULEX actually ‘establishes the border 
between Serbia and Kosovo’ which means renouncing a part of its territory.31 In other 
words, Serbia’s price for the ‘White Schengen’ list was a border with Kosovo.  
 
The Serbian leadership was on the defensive, as it was aware of the symbolic politics 
of the collaboration with EULEX in Kosovo. The agreement was concluded without a 
public ceremony, in stark contrast with public signings and photo opportunities used 
to maximum effect on other occasions when Serbia exchanged documents with the 
EU. The Government’s strategy in response to the criticism was two-pronged: it 
defended the depoliticised and technical nature of the protocol signed with EULEX 
while, at the same time, politicising its position on Kosovo as a defender of Serbia’s 
territorial integrity. Therefore, the deepening of cooperation with the EU coincided 
with a discursive contestation over Kosovo.  
 
The Serbian government supported its decision by arguing that the protocol was 
exclusively a technical agreement without political repercussions, and especially not 
                                                 
29 Danas, 15 September 2009a. 
30 Danas, 15 September 2009b. 
31 Politika, 13 September 2011. 
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those that would affect the status of Kosovo. Statements coming from EULEX 
affirming its exclusively technical nature were aimed to deflect its politicisation.32 
Further, Serbian officials were careful about the language. They kept referring to the 
‘administrative line’.33 Lastly, government representatives insisted that the protocol 
was ultimately based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and the 
report of the United Nations Secretary General on reconfiguration of the international 
presence in Kosovo.34 The reasoning was that the UN’s sanctioning of EULEX 
implied, contrary to the act of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, that Kosovo 
was still a part of Serbia.  
 
The defence of the protocol was coupled with the government’s positioning as a chief 
protector of Serbia’s national interests while affirming its position as a carrier and 
promoter of Serbia’s European project. Anticipating criticism, former President Tadić 
had made a pledge that he would not give up the struggle to keep Kosovo and 
Metohija (as Serbs refer to Kosovo) as part of Serbia, nor his support for European 
integration. In short, his motto is: ‘Both European Union and Kosovo, both Kosovo 
and the European Union.’35 This did not go as far as the opposition demands that it be 
written in law that Serbia would never join the European Union without Kosovo. 
Nonetheless, it forced Government officials to promise exactly that. Then Serbian 
Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić said: ‘We cannot trade Kosovo for entry into the EU’.36 
                                                 
32 e-novine, 11 September 2009. 
33 Blic, 12 September 2009. 
34 Blic, 17 August 2009. 
35 Politika, 3 March 2008; cf. Politika, 6 January 2010. 
36 Vreme, 6 November 2008. 
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The claim was reiterated by Serbia’s EU Integration Minister at the time, Božidar 
Ðelić in no uncertain terms: ‘If that choice is placed before us, we will choose 
Kosovo.’37  
 
The Serbian government and European Union officials maintained policy separation 
between Kosovo’s status resolution and the European integration process, considering 
them as two distinct processes. However, as the analysis above suggests, the 
separation has proved untenable. The two were thoroughly intertwined, not just from 
the point of view of domestic actors (cf. Noutcheva 2009, p. 1079). At a policy level, 
the EU’s ESDP agenda in Kosovo created new demands within the context of visa 
liberalisation with Serbia, shaping Serbia’s approximation to the EU by determining 
the scope and form of policy adaptation required, as illustrated by the signing of the 
police protocol. At the discursive level, the exclusion of Kosovo from the visa 
liberalisation process allowed the nationalist opposition to question the entire 
European course of Serbia. The Serbian government responded by establishing 
linkage between Kosovo's status and European integration, with the government 
positioning itself as an ultimate guardian of Serbian national interests, embodied by 
the preservation of Serbia’s territorial integrity. This was a discursive strategy that 
enabled the Serbian government to undertake hitherto a most radical adaptation of its 
Kosovo policy in technical terms, putting in place policies that acknowledged the 
border of Kosovo. The discursive positioning of the Serbian leadership, alongside 
denial of the extent of domestic change, enabled the pursuit of such a politically 
controversial policy.  
 
                                                 
37 Politika, 21 July 2008. 
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Explaining the EU’s leverage in Serbia  
 
According to a Serbian interior affairs official, Serbia’s policy both toward Kosovo 
and EULEX has been ‘schizophrenic.’38 This expression captures the contradiction 
between Serbia withholding the recognition of Kosovo, reflected in the official 
discourse and documents pertaining to Kosovo, and Serbia’s policy adaptation, which 
acknowledges Kosovo’s border as a fulfilment of EU conditionality in the area of visa 
liberalisation. Furthermore, it occurred despite a stipulation in the preamble of the 
Serbian constitution (adopted on 8 November 2006) that Kosovo and Metohija is an 
integral part of the territory of Serbia,39 affirmed in the Serbian Parliament’s 
resolution on its sovereignty,40 and its decision on annulling the Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence.41 How can this disconnect be explained?  
                                                 
38 Interview with Serbian interior affairs official, Belgrade, 22 December 2009. 
39 Ustav Republike Srbije, 2006, available at 
http://www.sllistbeograd.rs/documents/ustav_republike_srbije_lat.pdf, accessed 10 
November 2011.  
40 Rezolucija Narodne skupštine o zaštiti suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i 
ustavnog poretka Republike Srbije, 2007, available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.rs/Srpski/spopol/Prioriteti/KIM/kim_rezolucija_07_1_s.html, 
accessed 10 November 2011. 
41 Odluka Narodne skupštine Srbije o potvrđivanju odluke Vlade Republike Srbije o 
poništavanju protivpravnih akata privremenih organa samouprave na Kosovu I 
Metohiji o proglašenju jedonstrane nezavisnosti, 2008, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.rs/Srpski/spopol/Prioriteti/KIM/kim_skupstina_rezolucija_s.htm, 
accessed 15 November 2011.  
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The empirical findings in this study expose inadequacy of the SI and identity-based 
theories to account for the effectiveness of EU leverage to bring about Serbia’s tacit 
recognition of Kosovo’s border in the context of Europeanisation. As Subotić (2011, 
p. 326) demonstrates aptly in her identity-based analysis of Serbia, ‘European and 
national identity diverged during the process of Europeanization.’ Following the 
‘logic of appropriateness’, persistence of normative and identity divergence on the 
Kosovo issue would be an obstacle to compliance (cf. Checkel 2001). But, the 
empirical evidence in this study shows that exactly the opposite was the case in 
Serbia. Europeanisation in the policy domain, demonstrated by policy compliance in 
the context of visa liberalisation, for example in the exclusion of Kosovo Serbs from 
the visa regime, proceeded despite such divergence. In other words, although the 
‘policy window’ was seized to implement rule change, it did not lead to creation of 
new norms, either through social learning or socialisation (Checkel 1999, p. 551-52). 
Does the rational cost-benefit calculation in the ‘logic of consequentialism’ provide 
more analytical traction?  
 
Despite the association of the SAP and the Kosovo issue in the visa liberalisation 
process after Kosovo’s independence, support for EU membership in Serbia stood at 
61% percent in 2008.42 Additionally, analysts argued that then incumbent Boris 
                                                                                                                                            
 
42 Evropska orijentacija građana Srbije: Trendovi, Kancelarija za evropske 
integracije Vlade Srbije, 2008, available at:  
http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog 
_mnjenja/javno_mnjenje_decembar_08cir.pdf, accessed 3 March 2010. 
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Tadić’s playing of the pro-EU card in the second round of voting in the 2008 
presidential elections assured him the victory over his nationalist rival, Tomislav 
Nikolić. Pursuing the agenda of visa liberalisation, the first tangible benefit to 
Serbia’s citizens from approximation to the EU, was a rational policy of Serbia’s 
leadership that was worth the cost of unprecedented policy adaptation on the Kosovo 
border. This fact seems to confirm the “rewards hypothesis” that “the effectiveness of 
rule transfer increases with the size and speed of rewards” (Schimmelfenning & 
Sedelmeier 2004, p. 665).  However, the hypothesis starts to look less useful when 
you come to consider the prohibitive adaptation costs for a wide spectrum of Serbia’s 
institutional players in accommodating Kosovo. According to the “adoption cost 
hypothesis”, which correlates decreased rule adoption with the number of veto players 
incurring net adoption costs from compliance (Schimmelfenning & Sedelmeier 2004, 
p. 667), the likelihood of rule adoption would be very low in Serbia’s case. Reflecting 
this logic, Obradović-Wochnik & Wochnik (2012) overlook policy change in relation 
to Serbia’s Kosovo policy in the context of EU integration. By contrast, 
demonstrating the extent of domestic adaptation, this article offers the explanation 
that discursive denial  of the policy adjustment by Serbia’s leadership was a strategy 
to deal with the high adaptation costs. In this respect, politicisation of the Kosovo 
issue led to re-allocation of political resources in the domestic system (Radaelli & 
Pasquier 2007, p. 44). Further, Serbia’s leadership taking on the nationalist mantle on 
the issue of Kosovo indicates the use of discourse to marginalise institutional ‘veto 
players’. It is indicative of the complexity of Serbia’s Europeanisation, whose 
trajectory cannot be explained purely in terms of an instrumental rationality that 
separates interests from ideas, as embodied by the RI.  
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The DI perspective on Serbia’s Europeanisation provides an alternative explanation of 
why Serbia’s discourse on Kosovo was ‘successful’. In terms of discourse as a 
representation, it came across as resonant and adequate within what Schmidt calls the 
given ‘meaning context’, both contemporaneously and historically, considering Serbs’ 
‘mythic’ attachment to Kosovo (Anzulovic 1999). The denial of policy adaptation in 
the discourse allowed the Serbian leadership to implement policy change by 
managing the contradiction between the real strategic objective with the objective as it 
is construed (cf. Fairclough 2010, p. 484). In terms of discourse as an interactive 
process, the then Serbian leadership emerged as the owner of the successful discourse 
in interactions with the nationalist opposition and with Kosovo Serbs as discursive 
agents who were marginalised in the process. The adoption of the nationalist 
discourse by Serbia’s leadership, including the rejection of European integration 
(should a Kosovo condition be presented to Serbia) was used as a cover for the 
adaptation of policies in line with approximation to the EU (including those on the 
Kosovo border), required for the visa liberalisation process. Arguably, normative 
incongruence between discourse and policy accounts for the transformative  power of 
discourse in this case. The policy outcome in Serbia’s case, which is improbable from 
the RI and SI perspectives, can be explained by considering the ‘space of possibility’ 
(Lynggaard 2012, p. 88) created by the discourse.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This study contributes to the understanding of Europeanisation in post-communist 
states by identifying a hitherto overlooked disconnect between domestic adaptation in 
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the discursive and policy domains. Specifically, with reference to Serbia, it exposes 
another variation of ‘Potemkin harmonization’, the term Jacoby (1999) used to 
describe Europeanisation in CEE, where adopted rules exist as rhetoric but not as 
practise. This study of Serbia’s visa liberalisation points to reverse dynamics: rules 
are adopted and enforced in practice, but denied and even covered up discursively. 
The article found that discursive institutionalism offers appropriate analytical tools to 
explain such an unexpected and complex Europeanisation. It challenges the SI’s 
ability to explain Serbia’s ‘costly’ political adjustment on the Kosovo border in view 
of Serbia’s contestation of Kosovo’s independence. It adds to the RI-based 
explanation that can only partially account for policy adjustment given the interest of 
the then Serbian leadership in progressing towards the EU and the prohibitive costs of 
its Kosovo policy. In this sense, the RI could be said to serve as a ‘jumping-off point 
for DI, indicating what discursive institutionalists could usefully investigate and 
might do a better job explaining’ (Schmidt 2008, p. 319).  
 
Discursive institutionalism explains the paradox of Serbia’s domestic adaptation in 
the course of approximation to the EU: deepening of the contractual relationship with 
the EU, including appropriate policy adoption, coexists with discursive confrontation 
with the EU, especially on the Kosovo issue. The same explanation applies to the 
policy pursued by the new Serbian leadership following the 2012 parliamentary and 
presidential elections. However, this paradox also shows that DI overstates the 
deliberative aspect of discourse. Specifically, the case-study demonstrates that the 
discourse enabled but did not legitimise policy change precisely because of normative 
incongruence between discourse and policy.  
 
 31  
On the one hand, the research findings highlight the ‘shallow’ nature of 
Europeanisation with implications for the ‘lock-in of the institutional change’ 
(Sedelmeier 2012, pp. 22-23), given its discursive denial. On the other, they raise 
questions concerning the role of discourse in explaining domestic change. 
Specifically, engagement in a methodological dialogue with RI is needed to better 
understand the impact of the changing incentive structures on what Schmidt (2008, p. 
314) calls ‘foreground discursive abilities’, through which agents change or maintain 
institutions (cf. Béland & Cox 2011, p. 15). Börzel & Risse’s (2003, 57-89; Goetz  
2005, p. 262; Jacoby 2004, pp. 196-215; Checkel 2001, p. 581) argument that the 
‘logic of consequentialism’ and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ are not incompatible is 
instructive, pointing to further analytical possibilities including the ‘logic of 
communication.’  
 
Approaching discourse as a cause rather than the cause in line with the discursive 
institutionalist take on causality as an ‘empirical one showing when ideas and 
discourse matter and when they don’t’ (Schmidt 2011, p. 62), this research sought to 
explain domestic adaptation in face of restrictive adaptation costs. It asked the 
question how ideas and interests interact and connect, rather than drawing a 
distinction between the materialist and idealist analysis (Campbell 2002, pp. 33-34). 
The identified normative incongruence as an explanation of a discursively generated 
policy change questions the applicability of the constitutive logic associated with 
constructivism (cf. Wendt 1999), and its emphasis on consistency of discourse with 
values and norms in accounts of policy change (cf. Bhatia & Coleman 2003). This 
study thus reflects a need to ‘proceed from the study of discursive causalities towards 
substantial causal claims’ (Lynggaard 2011, p. 85), which can entail rethinking of 
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causality beyond the dualism between positivist and post-positivist approaches (Kurki 
2006; Gofas & Hay 2010; Tønder 2010). As Epstein notes (2008, p. 4), the distinction 
between explaining and understanding ‘precludes apprehending “meaning” as a cause 
of social action and as a factor of change and continuity, thereby undermining its 
explanatory purchase.’. 
 
Lastly, this study shows that Europeanisation in the Western Balkans is complex and 
uneven across different dimensions of institutional change, and thus eludes simple 
assessment of the EU’s multiple policies as either a failure or success. Such a 
conclusion reiterates the need to understand Europeanisation of what scholars call 
‘difficult’ (Subotić 2010), ‘impossible’ (Bieber 2011) and ‘limited’ states (Börzel 
2011), defined by complex political, ethnic and conflict legacy. From the ‘goodness 
of fit’ perspective, this concerns the extent to which the pursuit of multiple policies by 
the EU changes the scope of adaptation necessary to achieve the ‘fit’ as a result of 
cross-policy impact. It, therefore, requires rigorous research design that identifies and 
operationalises the sources of policy change in relation to their effect(s). In the 
Western Balkans, further understanding of EU conditionality is needed from a 
bottom-up perspective. The focus on domestic conditions, as mediators of EU 
leverage (Börzel 2011; Elbasani 2009), should also include consideration of the 
constantly shifting local policy context, which itself is partly caused by EU’s multiple 
policy instruments.  
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Table 1: Key events and relevance to enlargement and CFSP policies in Serbia 
and Kosovo 
 
Date SAP Visa Liberalisation ESDP 
15 Apr 05 EC approves Feasibility 
Report for Serbia and 
Montenegro’s SAA 
negotiations 
  
10 Oct 05  EU starts SAA negotiations 
with Serbia and 
Montenegro 
  
1 Nov 05   UN Secretary General 
appoints Ahtisaari 
20 Feb 06   Kosovo status talks begin 
under UN auspices 
6 May 06 SAA negotiations with 
Serbia suspended 
  
21 May 
06 
  Montenegro independence 
referendum 
20 Jun 06  Commission presents to the 
Council draft mandates to 
negotiate visa facilitation 
and readmission 
agreements 
 
13 Nov 06  Council approves 
negotiations on visa 
facilitation and readmission 
agreements with Western 
Balkan countries 
 
20 Nov 06  Start of negotiations on visa 
facilitation and readmission 
agreements with Western 
Balkan countries 
 
15 Mar 
07  
  Ahtisaari submits report to 
UN Secretary General 
recommending Kosovo 
independence 
16 May 
07 
 Visa facilitation and 
readmission agreement 
initialled 
 
13 Jun 07 SAA negotiations with 
Serbia continue 
  
August 07    US, EU and Russia Troika 
attempt to negotiate a 
solution to Kosovo status  
7 Nov 07  SAA with Serbia initialled   
7 Dec 07   Troika submits report to 
UN Secretary General; no 
agreement on Kosovo 
status 
14 Dec 07   EU leaders agree Kosovo 
negotiations exhausted and 
support ESPD mission to 
Kosovo 
1 Jan 08  Visa facilitation and 
readmission agreement 
comes into force  
 
30 Jan 08  Launch of visa dialogue 
with Serbia 
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Date SAP Visa Liberalisation ESDP 
4 Feb 08   EU’s European Union Rule 
of Law Mission (EULEX) 
to provide support for 
Kosovo established through 
EU Council's Joint Action  
17 Feb 08   Kosovo declares 
independence 
29 Apr 08 Serbia Signs SAA and 
Interim Agreement on 
Trade and Trade-related 
issues (IA), immediately 
suspended 
  
7 May 08  Visa road map presented to 
Serbia 
 
9 Sep 08 Serbian Parliament ratifies 
SAA and IA  
  
16 Oct 08 Serbian Parliament decides 
on unilateral 
implementation of IA  
  
26 Nov 08    UN Security Council 
authorises deployment of 
EULEX throughout Kosovo  
9 Dec 08    EULEX deployed in 
Kosovo 
1 Jan 09 Serbia’s unilateral 
implementation of IA 
  
6 April 09   EULEX opens headquarters 
in Pristina 
15 Jul 09  Commission proposes visa 
free travel for Serbian 
citizens pending 
compliance with 
outstanding requirements  
 
11 Sep 09  Police protocol between 
Serbian Interior Ministry 
and EULEX signed 
 
25 Sep 09  Serbia reports on meeting 
outstanding requirements 
 
19 Nov 09 
 
 Commission approves 
Serbia’s compliance with 
outstanding requirements  
 
30 Nov 09  Justice and Home Affairs 
Council go ahead to visa 
free travel for Serbia 
 
19 Dec 09  Start of visa free travel to 
EU for Serbian citizens 
 
22 Dec 09 Serbia submits application 
for EU membership 
  
1 Feb 10 IA comes into force   
14 Jun 10 Council decides to start 
SAA ratification process  
  
25 Oct 11 Council requests 
Commission Opinion on 
Serbia’s membership 
application 
  
12 Oct 11 Commission Opinion on 
Serbia’s membership 
application; conditional on 
normalising relations with 
  
 48  
Date SAP Visa Liberalisation ESDP 
Kosovo 
 
1 Mar 12 Council grants Serbia status 
of candidate country 
  
 
Source: www.europa.eu, www.securitycouncilreport.org, www.esi.web, www.eulex-
kosovo.eu, www.unmikonline.org, www.mfa.org.rs, www.grupa484.org.rs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
